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Πέμπτη 25 Φεβρουαρίου 2010

Herman Van Rompuy, non-combatant

Posted initiallu on Feb 15th 2010, 9:38 by Charlemagne on Ecomonomist

The Flemish newspaper De Morgen asked me to write them an op-ed on Herman Van Rompuy, the Belgian (and Flemish) politician who just organised his first summit as President of the European Council. It appeared in their weekend edition in translation.

MOST disputes in the European Union are struggles over money, or power. The “informal” summit of EU leaders called for February 11th by Herman Van Rompuy was intended to demonstrate the powers he wields in the new role of President of the European Council.

Mr Van Rompuy has the power to assemble the 27 heads of state and government and to set the agenda for their discussions—in this case, he wanted them to confront them with a serious question: how do we make Europe dynamic enough to pay for all the social entitlements that our citizens expect?

He has the power to cajole and persuade leaders and guide them, gently, towards a consensus. That was the plan for February 11th, anyway.  
Events decided otherwise. 

The informal summit to discuss economic growth became a crisis meeting to discuss ways to stop Greece toppling into bankruptcy. Suddenly, Mr Van Rompuy found himself chairing a heated discussion about money, and immediately one of the big limitations of his new job revealed itself.

Mr Van Rompuy is a president without a country behind him—a president without money.

So when a European Union crisis explodes that only money can fix, he will always be overshadowed by leaders who are putting their own taxpayers’ billions on the table.

Such leaders are not just making a financial sacrifice for Europe when they dig deep into their pockets. They are taking a political risk. In one opinion poll, by the Emnid institute, for instance, 71% of Germans opposed financial aid for Greece.

Mr Van Rompuy has no voters to fear. So in such disputes, he is a non-combatant: a counsellor but not a player.

Officials report that there was a moment, two days before the summit, when Mr Van Rompuy feared that Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy would reach a Franco-German deal by themselves, and announce it before the summit.

The European Council president worked hard to persuade the two leaders to wait, and bring their draft agreement to Brussels. Endorsement by 27 countries, he told them, would lend their political statement added weight.

Mr Van Rompuy got his way: the French and German leaders drafted a final deal in his office in the hideous Justus Lipsus complex near Schuman roundabout. That allowed the Belgian to announce a statement of support for Greece in the more elegant setting of the snow-covered Leopold Park, up the hill (even if, in a sign of Mr Van Rompuy’s lack of showbusiness experience, he had to deliver the statement twice, because he was inaudible to reporters the first time).

However, Mr Van Rompuy was disappointed to discover how vague that statement would have to be.

He had thought Mrs Merkel and Mr Sarkozy close to an agreement on a rescue plan for Greece.

However, with her own coalition in Germany divided, Mrs Merkel came to Brussels on a mission to stop any discussion of detailed scenarios, senior diplomats say. She cited constitutional reasons why Germany might not be able to bail out Greece, and told fellow leaders she did not trust Greece’s austerity plan.

Mr Van Rompuy discovered another limitation to his role at the summit. Once Greece was out of the way, the leaders turned to his original agenda—how to revive economic growth in Europe. Mr Van Rompuy had prepared a discussion paper, as had the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso.
But, as a president without his own economy to manage, Mr Van Rompuy’s paper carried little weight, and was swiftly forgotten as a chaotic discussion broke out leaders, diplomats say. Instead, Mr Barroso used the greatest power of the European Commission—its sole right to propose new legislation—to propose a raft of concrete measures.
In case Mr Barroso’s victory was not understood, his aides printed up his PowerPoint slides into a glossy brochure. While Mr Van Rompuy was still invisibly behind the scenes, mid-afternoon, commission press officers could be seen wheeling trolleys laden with Barroso-brochures into the Justus Lipsius complex, for distribution to journalists.
It is telling that the biggest buzz at the summit was felt at the joint Sarkozy-Merkel press conference on the second floor of the Justus Lipsius. French reporters hammered away at Mr Sarkozy about the vagueness of the plan. “Speculators” need to hear the message that Europe has a strategy for Greece, the French president insisted: the tactics could be worked out later. In contrast, German reporters peppered the chancellor with questions about why and how Germany should have to bail out Greece. She stressed Greek promises to get its house in order, and endure tough monitoring.
Downstairs, in the main press theatre of the Justus Lipsius, Mr Barroso and Mr Van Rompuy shared the official summit press conference. There was no buzz in the air. As Mr Van Rompuy calmly answered questions in a low monotone, an air of desperate boredom gripped journalists. Journalists knew they should be paying attention: Mr Van Rompuy is an important and serious man. But an unworthy thought lurked in every brain: five more years of this?

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